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THE ROLE OF ITALIAN PARLIAMENT IN THE
TREATY-MAKING PROCESS
GIOVANNI BOGNETI*
The so-called "democratization" of the treaty-making process-a
general trend in the history of all western developed countries-has also
taken place in the course of the more than one century long evolution of
Italian constitutional law. And yet that democratization in Italy seems,
for good or for bad, to have thus far progressed not only much less than
in the United States but less in general than in quite a few other western
countries. The role of the Italian Parliament was in the past, i.e., in the
period of liberal monarchy,' a very limited one, although to Parliament
were then entrusted, vis-i-vis the executive function of making treaties,
all the powers for the minimal protection of the vested rights of citizens
that was required by a typical nineteenth century liberal regime. The
republican Constitution of 1948 intended certainly to enlarge and
strengthen the participation of Parliament. How far, however, is not
clear. At any rate, the subsequent prevalent interpretation of the new
constitutional provisions, the impact of the developments of international
law in the area of intergovernmental agreements, and, last but not least,
the indifference that Parliament for a long time manifested with respect
to the subject-matter, all made for a substantial continuity with the past.
Only recently, in the Eighties, Parliament has awakened and a few
changes, both in the law and especially in the practice, have occurred:
changes that have given Parliament some more voice in the shaping of
the international agreements which Italy enters. This larger participa-
tion of Parliament is likely to continue in the future; whether it will also
grow in size is uncertain.
I shall first summarily describe the constitutional principles that
govern the participation of the Italian Parliament in the making and im-
plementing of international treaties and agreements, as they have been
interpreted by doctrinal writers and, in particular, as they have been put
into practice by Parliament and the government. I shall then examine
the possible legal consequences of the nonobservance of the principles
concerning the participation of Parliament both within the Italian legal
* Professor and Director of the Institute of Public Law, University of Milan.
1. The role of the Italian Parliament during the fascist period, for obvious reasons, is not
worth discussing.
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system and, also, within the international system, with an eye to the rele-
vant behavior of the courts as final interpreters of the law.
Note at the outset that we are dealing here only with the process of
treaty-making and treaty-implementation in general. The special case of
the treaties that gave rise to the European Community and of the body of
Community law that at present directly operates within the Italian legal
system is not considered, in as much as it is a case controlled by princi-
ples completely apart and different.
2
I. THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION,
DOCTRINAL WRITERS AND THE PRACTICE
The constitutional statute of the Sardinian, and later the Italian,
Kingdom, the "Statuto albertino" (1848), provided at article 5:
the King... makes the treaties, concerning peace, alliance, commerce
and other matters, and informs Parliament as soon as the interest and
the security of the state will permit.... Treaties carrying burdens for
the state finances or variations in the state territory will have effect
only after the Chambers have given their consent.
That provision was to a large extent borrowed from the text of the
1831 Belgian Constitution, which was in other respects also a blue-print
for the Italian "Statuto". In it, the term "the King" was soon interpreted
as "the government" (the cabinet, the ministers), because after 1855 the
form of government turned, in a stable manner, parliamentary. The gov-
ernment-as the letter of the provision makes clear-had the right to
conclude treaties (through all ways able to bind Italy at the international
level) without letting Parliament know in advance. If interrogated about
on-going negotiations, it could refuse the Chambers any information. It
could also keep the transaction secret after conclusion, if it thought that
secrecy served the interest of the nation. The treaty of the Triple Alli-
ance, which bound Italy to Austria-Hungary and Germany for many
years up to the eve of Italy's entry into World War I, was never known in
its details by Parliament. The text of the Treaty of London, that brought
Italy into that war, was known only after the end of it.
The provision of article 5 stated, however, that no effect would be
given to certain types of treaties without the consent of the Chambers.
At any rate, this consent could obviously be obtained by the government
after the treaty had been concluded. That meant that parliamentary con-
sent was not a condition, even for Italian constitutional law, for the va-
2. In the case of the European Community, Italy has given up part of its sovereignty in ac-
cordance with article 11 of the Constitution: a surrender of sovereignty that does not occur when a
normal treaty is concluded.
[V/ol. 67:391
PARLIAMENTAR Y PAR TICIPA TION IN ITAL Y
lidity and effectiveness of any treaty as a binding international agreement.
It was instead a condition only for the displaying of effects by some trea-
ties within the Italian legal system.
The group of treaties that needed parliamentary consent in order to
become operative within the Italian system was almost immediately rec-
ognized to exceed those expressly mentioned in article 5. If a treaty, in
order to be implemented by Italy, required modifications in the Italian
statutory law (the codes and the special statutes), the consent of Parlia-
ment in the form of a statute was held necessary.3 A statutory act was
also necessary to give effect to the treaties affecting the state finances,
because the budget was approved by a formal statute.
Occasionally the government found it expedient to submit treaties
for parliamentary approval, which needed parliamentary consent, and
had been signed but not yet ratified. In such cases it became customary
for Parliament to give its consent through a statute which carried a so-
called "order of execution" ("Full and entire execution shall be given to
the treaty"-to be ratified). The "order of execution" would transform
the treaty into Italian legal rules, capable of modifying Italian statutory
law. The "order" would become effective only if the treaty were later
ratified and became binding at international law. Of course, the "order
of execution" would be sufficient to give municipal force to the rules of
the international agreement only if these were "self-executing." If not,
Parliament was supposed to supply further rules, usually through a sub-
sequent statute, to make the Italian system comply with its duty to per-
form the obligations assumed through the international agreement.
When called upon to approve a treaty prior to ratification, Parliament
was not allowed, in principle, to introduce changes or reservations to the
treaty text as signed by the government. On the other hand, the govern-
ment had the right not to ratify a treaty even if Parliament had approved
it by issuing an "order of execution," or to ratify it with the reservations
it believed appropriate. Treaties which did not require the consent of
Parliament under article 5 would become effective within the Italian legal
system (in the sense that courts would be allowed and obliged to take
notice of them) upon a decree by the government that would make them
"executory." 4
3. Just as in Great Britain no international agreement could bring about changes in the com-
mon law or in the statutes without a special act of Parliament.
4. For the legal principles governing the treaty-making process under the monarch see Do-
NATO DONATI, I TRA-FATI INTERNAZIONALI NEL DIRInro COSTITUZIONALE (1906); Dionisio
Anzilotti, Alcune considerazioni sull' approvazione parlamentare dei trattati la cui esecuzione importa
provedimenti di natura legislativa, 4 RIViSTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 467 (1909); Gu-
1991]
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In the period of liberal monarchy, the shaping of Italian foreign pol-
icy through the conclusion of treaties rested thus almost exclusively in
the hands of the Executive. Parliament would exercise a vague form of
control through the vote of confidence that the cabinet was supposed to
obtain upon the presentation of its program to the Chambers. The for-
mal consent of Parliament was necessary to give municipal relevance to
certain important treaties. But treaties of the utmost importance, such as
treaties of alliance, were not included in this group. In addition, because
parliamentary consent could be obtained after the treaty had come into
force at the international level, in practice the consent had to be given by
Parliament anyway, in order not to involve Italy in a violation of interna-
tional law. In such cases, the pressure on Parliament to approve the
treaty was particularly strong because a refusal would have "exposed"
not only the cabinet but also the King, who had formally signed and
ratified the treaty. The Crown-as the saying went-was to be "cov-
ered." 5 The practice of submitting treaties to Parliament for approval
before their ratification enhanced the role of Parliament a little. Because
in thi, case a possible refusal would not entail an international wrong,
and Piarliament was in theory freer to dissent. But the practice was left
entirely to the discretion of the government and was, in fact, at the end of
the period, still quite limited. In conclusion, the role of Parliament in the
treaty-making process was minimal.
The relationship between the municipal law and international law
was structured, in the Italian law of the period, along lines strictly in
accordance with the logic of a dualistic model. International rules of all
kinds-and in particular treaty rules-would have effect within the Ital-
ian system only if admitted into it by some special act of the Italian
state-a statute or a governmental decree, according to the case. It was
on this basis that Italian jurists in general-notably Professor Anzilotti-
sided at the time with the dualistic theory and contributed to the devel-
opment and the rational articulation of the model. For them, interna-
tional rules would count for the Italian judge only if appropriately
"transformed" into national rules.
GLIELMO NEGRI, LA DIREZIONE E IL CONTROLLO DEMOCRATICO DELLA POLITICA ESTERA IN
ITALIA, 1-15 (1967).
5. The majority in the House of Deputies was opposed to Italy's entering into World War I in
May, 1915. But when it learned that a secret treaty had been signed in London a month before,
pledging Italy to join the Allies in the war, the House, though still ignoring the exact terms of the
treaty, gave in and voted for the war in order not to "expose" the Crown. This was the most
important instance of pressure applied on Parliament during the monarchy period in order to make
it accept the independent choices of the cabinet, acting in the name of the King, in matters of foreign
policy and treaty implementation.
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The republican Constitution of 1948, in the first place provides, at
article 10, that "the Italian legal system conforms to the norms of inter-
national law generally recognized." This provision has been interpreted,
by doctrinal writers and the Constitutional Court (decisions no. 32 of
1960, nos. 67 and 68 of 1961), as introducing directly (i.e., without need
of any special state action) all the rules of international customary law
into the Italian legal system. They are, therefore, presently cognizable by
the courts and immediately applicable by them in their decisions. More-
over, article 10 grants them a rank, in the system of law sources, superior
to ordinary legislation. Thus, a statute conflicting with them should be
referred by the proceeding judge to the Constitutional Court and be de-
clared unconstitutional on that basis. A few writers have argued that, as
the principle pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental element of interna-
tional customary law, article 10 was to be read as also indirectly intro-
ducing all particular international agreements to which Italy is a party
into the Italian system, equally giving them a rank superior to ordinary
legislation. (The principle pacta sunt servanda, possessing constitutional
stature, would otherwise be de facto disregarded.) 6 This doctrine has
been rejected by the overwhelming majority of experts and by the Consti-
tutional Court (decisions no. 14 of 1964, no. 96 of 1982). Therefore, at
the moment all treaties and agreements that bind Italy at the interna-
tional level must still be-unlike international customary law-"trans-
formed" into national law through a special act of the Italian state in
order to become "justiciable" in an Italian court. Further, treaty rules
have the same legal rank of the act that introduces them into the Italian
system. As a consequence, a subsequent state act of the same or a supe-
rior rank (a statute, or a governmental decree) might in theory contradict
the "italianized" treaty rules and should be considered overriding by all
Italian judges. This might cause Italy to default in the eyes of interna-
tional law but makes no illegal dent in the texture of the Italian law.
7
As for the formation of treaties and agreements (the conventional
international law), the Constitution provides simply in article 80 that
6. Giuseppe Sperduti, Trattati internazionali e leggi dello stato, 65 RiVISTA DI DIRITrO IN-
TERNAZIONALE 5 (1982); GIACINTO Bosco, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 125 (1981).
See also ROLANDO QUADRI, DIRITO INTERNAZIONALE PUBBLICO 63 (1968), who believes that
treaties, once regularly concluded, operate within the Italian legal system without need of a special
"order of execution." He does not seem, however, to attribute to them a rank superior to statutes.
7. The different ways by which international customary law and treaties are made to operate
within the Italian legal system, and their different rank as law sources, are aptly described by
ANTONIO LA PERGOLA, COSTITUZIONE E ADATIFAMENTO DELL'ORDINAMENTO INTERNO AL
DIRITro INTERNAZIONALE (1961). This volume has been recently translated into Spanish, with an




"The Houses of Parliament authorize by statute the ratification of the
treaties that are by nature political, or provide for arbitrations or judicial
settlements of disputes, or involve variations in the state territory or bur-
dens on the state finances or modifications in the statutory law."
Further, in article 87 the Constitution provides that: "[t]he Presi-
dent of the Republic... ratifies the international treaties, after they have
been authorized by the Houses, if the Constitution so requires."
Through these provisions the framers of the Constitution wanted to
put an end to the old practice of secret treaties such as the Triple Alli-
ance and the London treaties. Beyond that the new constitutional princi-
ples were intended to make some changes in the previous rules and uses
of monarchical Italy; but the precise extent of the changes remains open
to argument.
For instance it might be argued, assuming that the provisions of ar-
ticles 80 and 87 must be taken in their literal sense, that the Constitution
implies principles of this kind, vastly innovating vis-i-vis the old law:
a. Because the term "treaty" must be taken to refer to all kinds of inter-
national agreements, article 87 requires Italy to conclude all its agree-
ments in a form that keeps signature and ratification distinct and makes
the agreements internationally binding and operative only after
ratification.
b. The rule that the President ratifies the treaties is a particular applica-
tion of the idea of his role as a "guarantor" of the Constitution and of
legality. All international agreements must therefore be submitted to the
President before ratification so that he may check that they are not con-
trary to the Constitution and to the law.
c. The negotiation and signature of treaties belong to the government,
while ratification can occur only after the President has determined their
lawfulness. This holds for all treaties. But with respect to the treaties
mentioned in article 80, there is an additional condition for their being
validly concluded from the point of view of the Italian Constitution. Af-
ter a treaty is signed, and before it comes into force at international law
via ratification, Parliament must consent to the treaty. In particular, the
phrase "treaties by nature political" must be taken at its face value. And
because almost all international treaties have political implications, Par-
liament would enjoy a sort of preventive veto on nearly all the interna-
tional engagements into which Italy enters.
Perhaps this construction was what the framers actually had in
mind, perhaps not. In any case, strict compliance with it would have
made it impossible for Italy to participate in the international life of the
[Vol. 67:391
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post-World War II world without serious impairments. So, the construc-
tion was never accepted by the Italian constitutional and international
lawyers (at least not without important qualifications) and was even
more largely disregarded by the practice of the constitutional state or-
gans (government, Parliament, the President).
The principle (under part a.) above would have prohibited Italy
from concluding agreements in simplified form. Currently the simplified
form is by necessity and convenience the most usual way international
agreements are concluded. The solemn, cumbersome form of ratification
is not suited for most of the numerous transactions that take place be-
tween contemporary nations. All the Italian writers have therefore read
article 87 as implicitly admitting the valid existence in Italian law of trea-
ties or agreements concluded by simple governmental signature, without
presidential ratification. Cassese, Carlassare, and Lippolis reach this con-
clusion because article 87 has been said to refer only to the treaties that
the government freely chooses to conclude via ratification." Monaco and
Franchini argue it is because a constitutional convention or a customary
rule must be considered to have modified the article's original meaning.9
One writer, Giuliano, has maintained that agreements in simplified form
are admissible on the theory that the President has generally and perma-
nently delegated to the government the power to conclude treaties with-
out his intervention. 10
Without bothering to adduce any particular theoretical justification,
the Italian government did not hesitate to conclude hundreds of treaties
in simplified form after 1948. And neither Parliament nor the President
have, at least with respect to the question of principle, raised any
objection.
Further with respect to the interpretation of the term "treaties by
nature political," the prevailing trend among the writers is to shun the
construction mentioned above. In general, jurists hold that the category
is confined only to treaties that are of some serious importance to the
8. Antonio Cassese, Articolo 87, comma VIII, in COMMENTARIO DELLA COSFITUZIONE 223,
226-31 (Giuseppe Branca ed., 1978); Antonio Cassese, Articolo 80, in COMMENTARIO DELLA COSTI-
TUZIONE, 150, 154 (Giuseppe Branca ed., 1979); LORENZA CARLASSARE, REGOLAMENTI
DELL'ESECUTIVO E PRINCIPIO Di LEGALITA' 298 (1966); VINCENZO LIPPOLIS, LA COSTITUZIONE
ITALIANA E LA FORMAZIONE DEI TRATrATI INTERNAZIONALI 206 (1989).
9. Riccardo Monaco, La ratifica dei trattati internazionali nel quadro costituzionale, in STUDi
PER IL XX ANNIVERSARIO DELL'ASSEMBLEA COSTITUENTE 456-59 (1969); Marco Franchini, I
poteri del governo nella conclusione degli accordi internazionali, 30 RIVmsrA TRIMESTRALE DI DIR-
rrro PUBBLICO 26, 36 (1980).
10. MARIO GIULIANO, ET AL., 1 Diritto Internazionale 672 (2d ed. 1983). See also Manio
Udina, Gli accordi internazionali in forma semplificata e la Costituzione italiana, 45 RIVISTA DI
DIRiro INTERNAZIONALE 201, 211 (1962).
1991]
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state. Hence an authorization by Parliament need not precede presiden-
tial ratification in cases of minor consequence, and the government has
some discretion in choosing whether or not, in doubtful cases, to proceed
without involving Parliament. I I
On the questions of the validity of agreements in simplified form and
of the scope of the clause concerning political treaties, Italian legal the-
ory is disposed to admit for the government a larger role in the treaty-
making process than the letter of the Constitution would perhaps counte-
nance. Legal theory is, in general, far less ready to justify the bold line of
interpretation chosen by the government, and the substantial acquies-
cence towards it of Parliament (and of the President), when it comes to
other fundamental problems concerning the formation of treaties.
The first of such problems involves the possibility of the government
choosing to conclude treaties in simplified form, or omitting a request for
a preventive approval by Parliament, in areas that articles 80 and 87,
taken together, seem to reserve to treaties concluded by way of presiden-
tial ratification preceded by an authorization by Parliament.
One writer, Monaco, believes that at least in some of these areas, e.g.
important political treaties and treaties carrying financial burdens, the
government is on principle entitled to proceed without previous parlia-
mentary permission and in simplified form, if the interest of the state so
requires.1 2 In other words, the Constitution would have introduced al-
most no basic changes with respect to the law of the monarchy on this
point. But all other jurists are of the opinion that such a procedure
would be highly irregular. Some expressly mention the possibility of Par-
liament raising a "conflict of powers" before the Constitutional Court in
order to have this unconstitutional behavior of the government stopped.
And a similar "conflict" could be raised by the President, when bypassed
through an agreement in simplified form in one of the areas of article
80.13
However, most of the writers who consider the procedure irregular
also believe that Parliament can, once the treaty has been concluded
without the prior necessary consent, validate it later through a subse-
quent statute providing for the municipal execution of it or even through
a simple resolution.14 The reason to concede the possibility of a belated
11. LiPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 102-07.
12. Monaco, supra note 9, at 456, 459; See also Riccardo Monaco, I trattati internazionali e la
nuova Costituzione, I RASSEGNA DI DIRITro PUBBLICO 202, 204, 214 (1949).
13. LIPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 301.
14. CONSTANTINO MORTATI, ISTITUZIONI Di DIRllro PUBBLICO 684 (9th ed. 1976); Giu-
seppe Sperduti, Rilevanza internazionale delle disposizioni costituzionali sulla stipulazione dei trattati
e suoi limiti, in 2 SCRITT DI DRiTro INTERNAZIONALE IN ONORE DI TOMASO PERASSI 301, 323
[Vol. 67:391
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parliamentary approval is obvious. It would be incongruous to prohibit
Parliament from giving effect to an agreement, which is meanwhile in
force at the international level, and which the Houses consider favorably.
On the other hand, allowing for approval after the event practically takes
away much of the institutional strength of the prescribed pre-approval.
The government may always be tempted to act without prior parliamen-
tary authorization in the hope of obtaining a confirmation later.
In the realm of fact, the government, at least until a few years ago,
has repeatedly concluded binding agreements in matters falling unques-
tionably within the categories contemplated by article 80 without previ-
ous authorization by Parliament. The examples abound. Following are
a few of them:
a. Italy joined the United Nations in 1955 upon demand of
admission by the government, only later confirmed by Parliament
through a statute carrying an "order of execution".
b. The London Agreement of 1954, concerning Trieste and
the surrounding territory, was concluded by the government in a
simplified form (simple signature) and was later "approved" by Par-
liament while voting on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
c. In 1976, Italy and the United States concluded an agree-
ment in simplified form concerning mutual judicial assistance in the
Lockheed case, an agreement which on the side of Italy involved
modifications in the law of criminal procedure. The municipal con-
sequences of the agreement were later regulated by the Italian gov-
ernment through a decree-law.
d. The participation of the Italian mine-sweepers in the naval
operations at the Tiran Straits in 1982 was the object of an agree-
ment between the Italian government and the Sinai Multinational
Force. The government gave it "immediate, temporary execution,"
while introducing in Parliament a bill for the authorization of a be-
lated ratification. The bill was passed into law when the naval oper-
ations had already ended.
e. A similar procedure (immediate, temporary execution and
subsequent parliamentary approval) was also adopted in the case of
the agreements between Italy and Lebanon, for the participation of
Italian military forces in the two peace missions in Beirut in 1982.
The procedure was used again with the agreement between Italy and
(1957); BENEDETTO CONFORTI, LEZIONI DI DIrrTO INTERNAZIONALE 64 (2d ed. 1982); Lip-
POLlS, supra note 8, at 234. Contra Cassese, Articolo 80, supra note 8, at 188.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Egypt, for Italian participation in the mine-sweeping of the Suez Ca-
nal in 1984. The list goes on. 15
In such cases, the government, if it has advanced a justification at
all, has relied in general on the theory that the international practice
contemplates as legitimate the forms that were adopted for the conclu-
sion of the agreements, and the circumstances were, at any rate, urgent.
A justification more specifically to the point was advanced by the govern-
ment in cases where the agreements, concluded in simplified form, could
be placed within the framework of a previous treaty, concluded accord-
ing to the rules of article 80. Those agreements, the government con-
tended, were only instances of "execution" of the original treaty and did
not need, as such, a previous authorization by Parliament. Accordingly,
the government asked neither for previous nor subsequent specific ap-
proval by Parliament, for instance, of the agreements concluded in sim-
plified form with the United States in 1959 for the installation of the
Jupiter missiles at Gioia del Colle; in 1972 for the concession of a naval
base at La Maddalena; in 1984 for the installation of Cruise missiles in
Italian territory. These agreements were not "new treaties" in as much
as they simply "implemented" general obligations already existing under
the NATO treaty. In 1959 the government added that a presentation to
Parliament of agreements implementing the NATO treaty and concern-
ing military matters was impossible because national security required
that such matters be kept secret. 16
In some of these various cases the opposition of the left protested
that the rules of article 80 had been violated; but in other cases, where
the action of the government was deemed politically acceptable, the very
same opposition forgot about constitutional objections and joined in a
vote of late approval. This was true, for example, in the two cases of the
1982 Beirut missions. The majority, however, always stood behind the
government, and Parliament never censured, with a vote or otherwise,
the practice of making treaties without its prior approval, even in the
special areas named by article 80.
15. A detailed description of the cases mentioned above, together with the story of other similar
cases, can be found in Augusto Barbera, Gli accordi internazionali tra Governo, Parlamento e corpo
elettorale, QUADERNI CosTrruZIONALI 439, 450-64 (1984); A. Massai, Parlamento e politica estera:
l'Italia, QUADERNI COSTrruzIONALI 559, 576-94 (1984).
See also Sergio Marchisio, Sulla competenza del governo a stipulare in forma semplificata i trat-
tati internazionali, 58 RIVISTA DI DIRrrro INTERNAZIONALE 533 (1975); Cassese, Articolo 80, supra
note 8, at 181-91; Silvano Labriola, Principi costituzionalk ordinamento e prassi nella disciplina della
autorizzazione legislativa alla ratifica degli accordi internazionali, 18 RiVISTA Di DIRITTO INTERNA-
ZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 209, 242-48 (1982); LIPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 194, 228.
16. Cf SERGIO MARCHISiO, LE BASI MILITARI NEL D1Rrrro INTERNAZIONALE 117-22
(1984); Franchini, supra note 9, 54-58; LIPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 195.
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Another group of fundamental problems regarding the participation
of Parliament in the treaty-making process involves the nature of the
authorizing statute prescribed by article 80, and the powers that Parlia-
ment can exercise when discussing and voting on it.
Here the jurists are divided. Some, moving explicitly or implicitly
from the idea that the Constitution wants to make Parliament a partici-
pant almost with equal rights in the making of treaties, tend to define for
Parliament rather large powers with respect to the shaping of the statute
in question; others, instead, believing that foreign policy is, by the Con-
stitution, an almost exclusive province of the Executive, lean towards in-
terpretations that restrict more severely the role of Parliament.
Writers generally acknowledge that the government has the exclu-
sive power of initiating the negotiation, of signing the text and of intro-
ducing the bill in Parliament for the authorization to ratify. But a
handful of them hold that in the absence of a bill presented by the gov-
ernment, members of the Houses would be entitled to take the
initiative. 17
The real division between scholars pertains to the problem of
whether Parliament may, through amendments, make its consent to the
text signed by the government conditional, or whether the only possible
thing Parliament can do is to answer "yes" or "no" to the question of
ratification and to the question of giving the treaty municipal effect. The
statute contemplated by article 80 usually carries, along with authoriza-
tion to ratify, an "order of execution." This practice had begun under
the monarchy and has been continued with the Republic. Some writ-
ers-e.g., Lippolis-maintain that the statute of article 80 should always
carry an "an order of execution," in addition to the clause concerning the
authorization to ratify, at least when the treaty which is authorized for
ratification is "self-executing."' 8
Only a few jurists-e.g., Chimenti-believe that the Houses can,
through the statute, reshape the clauses of the treaty already signed,
thereby indirectly compelling the government to reopen the negotiations
17. The prevailing opinion, reserving to the government all phases of the treaty-making process
up to the consent vote to be cast by Parliament, is expressed, e.g., by Walter Leisner, La funzione
governativa dipolitica estera e la separazione deipoteri, 10 RiVISTA TRIMESTRALE Di DIRITrO PUB-
BLICO 342, 359, (1960) and more recently, by LIPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 16, 125. The right of
parliamentarians to initiate autonomously the bill of authorization is asserted, eg., by ANTONIO
BERNARDIN1, FORMAZIONE DELLE NORME INTERNAZIONALI E ADATTAMENTO DEL DIRITO IN-
TERNO 204 (1973).
18. LPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 48, 87.
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at the international level. 19 One writer--Giuliano--argues that the stat-
utory clause of authorization cannot contain modifications of a text that
has been agreed upon internationally in a definitive way; but that the
"order of execution" can instead reshape or change, with regard to the
municipal effects of the treaty, the rules established by this.20
The consequence of this, however, would be that the President
would then ratify a treaty when the internal, precise execution of it
would be, to say the least, in doubt from the moment of ratification. As
discussed earlier, Italian constitutional law admits of derogations by sub-
sequent statutes from treaty rules in force in the municipal system. But
Giuliano seems to approve of a derogation already announced at the very
moment Italy binds itself internationally through the treaty ratification.
Jurists who would like Parliament to be able one way or another to
tamper openly via the statute of article 80 with the obligations of the
treaty to be ratified or with its internal effects are in a minority. Much
more numerous are those who would confer upon Parliament vast pow-
ers, at least in the area of reservations.
Reservations, both "interpretative" and "exception-making," can be
attached essentially only to the adhesion to multilateral treaties and on
principle should not be able to alter the rules of a treaty, but simply aim
at eliminating the applicability of one or more rules to the party making
the reservation. Many believe that the government should obtain from
Parliament an express authorization to ratify with reservations, so that
all reservations attached to the text as finally ratified ought to have been
expressly consented to by the authorizing statute.2 1 Some maintain that
Parliament can also formulate reservations on its own initiative and of its
own choice in the statute. The government, if it then proceeds to ratify,
ought to ratify with the reservations established by Parliament.
22
All this would give Parliament a definite control over the shaping of
reservations. Some lawyers, especially those of the internationalist
branch, consider this inappropriate. 23 They argue that would unduly
complicate the process of making and applying treaties and excessively
19. CARLO CHIMENTI, IL CONTROLLO PARLAMENTARE NELL'ORDINAMENTO ITALIANO 268
(1974).
20. Mario Giuliano, E' emendabile o inemendabile l'ordine di esecuzione di trattati internazion-
all?, 18 RIVISTA DI DIRrrro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 5 (1982).
21. MORTATI, supra note 14, at 683; Cassese, Articolo 80, supra note 8, at 163; Barbera, supra
note 15, at 449.
22. Livio Paladin, Cid che rimane del conceto di leggeformale, in STUDI IN ONORE MANILO
UDINA 1754 (1975); LIPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 113.
23. Gaetano Morelli, Ordine di esecuzione e adattamento ... del diritto internazionale al diritto
inferno, 62 RiVISTA Di DRirrro INTERNAZIONALE 229 (1979).
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restrict the power of the Executive. They point out that article 80 simply
wants Parliament to consent (or to deny consent) to the treaty as such;
the business of reservations is the government's business. The govern-
ment should not be compelled to obtain from Parliament any authoriza-
tion with respect to reservations. If they were formulated when the
treaty was signed, they must not be submitted together with the text to
the vote of Parliament. After the vote, the government can add all fur-
ther reservations it sees fit. The authorization of Parliament should con-
cern only the whole of the treaty; Parliament can be presumed, once its
consent has been given and the government has attached reservations, to
have also consented implicitly also to something which is simply less
than the whole of the treaty authorized (the treaty minus the
reservations).
While lawyers dispute this issue, Parliament has consistently taken a
very specific position on all these problems. Briefly, the position is com-
pletely favorable to the absolutely predominant role of the Executive in
the treaty-making process. It is therefore no surprise that Parliament
and the government should have always agreed on the scope of their re-
spective rights in these matters.
In the standing rules of the two Houses, there is no express provi-
sion forbidding members of Parliament from introducing amendments to
a bill presented by the government, in accordance with the principles of
article 80. But the steady practice of Houses' Presidents is to declare any
amendment of that kind unreceivable. 24 When Senator Giuliano, the ju-
rist, tried to make the Senate accept his distinction between amendments
to the "authorizing clause" (inadmissible) and amendments to the "order
of execution" (admissible), his attempt was flatly rejected. The President
said the bill must be voted on the text prepared by the government.25 As
for reservations, apparently in only one case (concerning the multilateral
U.N. treaty on civil and political rights) the government, perhaps by mis-
take, presented to Parliament a bill in which the reservations it intended
to attach at the moment of ratification were included. Parliament ap-
proved the clauses containing the reservations in 1977, but later it was
explained that the clauses had to be interpreted not as "real reservations"
but as "interpretive declarations" of the meaning of the treaty text. At
any rate, when the government finally ratified the treaty, further reserva-
24. See ATri PARLAMENTARI. CAMERA DE DEPUTATI. VII LEGISLATURA, 3646-7; VIII
LEGISLATURE, 26594. Apparently, however, there has been recently an exception to the practice:
ATTi PARLAMENTARI. CAMERA DEi DEPUTATI. IX LEGISLATURA. Discuss1ONI (May 30, 1985),
28304.
25. Giuliano, supra note 20, at 23-26.
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tions were added to the ones approved by Parliament, so that it was un-
mistakably clear that the government considered itself the only dominus
in the subject-matter of reservations.26 And of course there are many
instances of reservations made by the government to various other multi-
lateral treaties without even orally informing Parliament.
Another set of problems has to do with the "life" of the treaty subse-
quent to ratification, considering the possible termination, renewal and
consensual variation of treaties. The doctrinal opinion is practically
unanimous that the government, even after the statute authorizing ratifi-
cation, is perfectly free not to ratify. However, quite a few jurists believe
that once the ratification has occurred the government is not free to dis-
pose of the subsequent destiny of a treaty without parliamentary consent
when the treaty had to be, and was, authorized by Parliament in accord-
ance with article 80. In order to terminate or to prolong the duration of
such a treaty, the government should ask for a new statutory authoriza-
tion, except perhaps when the possibility of termination or prolongation
was contemplated by an express clause in the treaty itself. This is also
the case with modifications.
27
Some contest this opinion, and the practice at any rate is in the op-
posite direction. The Italian government has, in forty years, denounced,
prolonged and modified many treaties of all sorts (including some be-
longing to the categories mentioned by article 80) without previously
consulting Parliament.
From the discussion thus far, the role of the Italian Parliament in
the treaty-making process appears to be a very modest one. However, in
recent times things have changed to a certain extent, and Parliament has
taken a keener interest and a more active role in the shaping of foreign
relationships. But the change has not occurred up to now through a
reinterpretation of parliamentary rights under articles 80 and 87. The
principles governing the practice, outlined in the preceding pages, still
essentially hold. The change has taken place through another route and
through the use of other institutional tools.
As in many other western constitutional systems, Parliament in It-
aly can get information about the intentions of the government and can
direct its behavior up to a point through such means of control as inter-
26. On the whole episode, see Giorgio Badiali, Le riserve formulate dallItalia al Patto delle
Nazioni Unite sui diritti civili e politici nel quadro dei rapporti constituzionali tra Parlamento
e Governo, 19 COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI DELL'ISTrTUTO DI DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE
DELL'UNIVERSITA DI MILANO 25 (1980).
27. Cassese, Articolo 80, supra note 8, at 168; GIULIANA ZICCARDI CAPALDO, LA COM-
PETENZA A DENUNCIARE I TRATrATI INTERNAZIONAL! 63 (1983); LA PERGOLA, supra note 7, at
162; LIPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 116.
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rogations, interpellations, hearings, inquiries and motions. In the 1950s
and 1960s these means of control were seldom used in the area of foreign
policy with respect to treaties about to be negotiated, or in course of
internal implementation. The attitude of Parliament changed in the
1970s. In the 1980s, the dialogue between Parliament and the govern-
ment through these channels became constant and rather intense. The
standing committees on foreign affairs of the two Houses now keep per-
manently in touch with the government in order to monitor the moves of
the latter.
The first, and until now perhaps most important, instance of an in-
ternational agreement in the negotiation of which Parliament indirectly
but actively participated was the New Concordat with the Holy See. The
government, while the negotiations were progressing, was willing to dis-
cuss the subject with the Houses and was willing to accept, as a starting
point for further negotiations, their recommendations approved through
motions. The New Concordat was finally approved by Parliament and
ratified in 1984.28
Perhaps in this instance the willingness of the government to involve
Parliament in that phase of the negotiations was due to the special matter
that was at stake and to the desire to solicit a particularly large consent.
But the impression is that the government is presently far less reluctant
in general than it was thirty or forty years ago to let Parliament partici-
pate in stages of the treaty-making process which belong in theory to its
exclusive sphere.
The recent readiness and desire of Parliament to have a larger say in
the treaty-making process are also evidenced by other facts. In 1984, the
government asked that a special fund be permanently appropriated in the
budget in order to provide for expenditures connected with possible
agreements to be concluded in the future and to be put into immediate
execution (as in the case of the participation in the peace missions to
Beirut). Parliament refused. If it had consented, it would have given a
general, blank authorization to future, important political engagements
still undetermined in their precise nature and contents, without even pre-
serving to itself the duty and the power to approve or disapprove them
after the event in the course of the discussion over the necessary
appropriations. 29
In 1984 Parliament passed a statute whereby all international agree-
28. Antonio Cassese, I trattati internazionali e il ruolo delle Commissioni affari esteri, in
PARLAMENTO E POLITICA ESTERA 112 (1982); LIPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 20.
29. See Massai, supra note 15, at 583-84.
1991]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ments, including the ones in simplified form, must be inserted, as soon as
concluded, in the "Raccolta ufficiale" and must be communicated to the
Presidents of the two Houses (legge no. 839 of 1984, articles 1, 4). 30 By
this law, Parliament is now in a position to know the obligations con-
tracted by the government at the international level without first inform-
ing the Houses. Before 1984, many agreements concluded in simplified
form remained instead unknown, or almost unknown, to the public at
large and to their representatives. Now the people's representatives can
at least discuss the merits of all agreements of that kind and suggest pos-
sible better lines of action to the government for the future. It can be
doubted, however, that really all the agreements concluded after 1984 by
the government have been published. Some concerning details of mili-
tary matters may have remained secret.
31
Finally, the wish on one hand to further "democratize" the treaty-
making process and the growing perception on the other hand that the
procedures of articles 80 and 87, if followed to the letter, are not suited to
adequately meet the needs of contemporary international life have
prompted many in the 1980s to advocate constitutional reforms in the
field. Parliament, for its part, set up in 1984 a special parliamentary
committee ("Commissione Bozzi") charged with the task of making pro-
posals concerning possible amendments to the Constitution in general.
The committee came forward with a particular proposal in regard to the
treaty-making process. Article 80 should have been replaced by a longer
article, of the following tenor:
Every international agreement or treaty is made known by the
government to the Houses before the signing of it.
Upon petition of one third of the members of a House, presented
within 15 days, Parliament expresses its judgment on the agreement or
treaty. This time limit can be shortened in exceptional cases, if the
government so requests. If the petition is not presented within the pre-
scribed time, Parliament is presumed to have consented, for all pur-
30. A comment on, and a critical evaluation of, the statute is provided by Silvano Labriola, La
pubblicazione degli atti normativi e la circolazione delle notizie sulle relazioni internazionali della
Repubblica italiana, 21 RIVISTA DI DIRrrro INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 235
(1985). See also LIPPOLIS, supra note 8, at 221.
31. To begin with, the publication in the GAZErA UFFICIALE of the agreements concluded in
simplified form often is not de facto complete; technical appendices to the agreements are at times
not reported.
With respect to military and secret service agreements, a justification for their not being dis-
closed may be found in the general principle that state security requires secrecy. Secret treaties do
not seem to be, on principle, admitted by the Constitution. But agreements only "implementing"
treaties already consented to by Parliament may perhaps be kept secret. The government has, in the
past, so contended. And for such agreements an implicit exception may be read in the general rule
of publicity established by statute no. 839 of 1984, article 4. On all these problems, see LIPPOLIS,
supra note 8, at 217.
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poses, to the subsequent steps leading to the conclusion of the
agreement or treaty.
An authorization by statute is always necessary for the ratification
of agreements or treaties involving variations of the territory, financial
burdens, modifications of statutory law and of those relative to the as-
sumption of military obligations.
The same procedures must be followed in case of denunciation of,
or recession from, an agreement in force.
Once the above mentioned procedures have been accomplished,
the Italian legal system ensures full observance of all international
agreements and treaties duly concluded.
This proposed amendment to the Constitution has not been
adopted, and is not likely to be in the near future. Therefore, detailed
comment is not necessary. But the simple reading of it is sufficient to
give an idea of how much larger the role of Parliament and how different
on the whole the Italian law on treaty-making would have been if the
proposal of the Bozzi committee-which at the moment reflected the
feelings of a majority in Parliament-had gotten through.
32
II. THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT AND THE ITALIAN COURTS
Which are the judicial processes that can be used to protect, within
the Italian legal system, the role of Parliament in the treaty-making pro-
cess as established by the Constitution and the laws? And what has been,
in fact, the behavior of the Italian courts towards the problem of the
participation of Parliament in that process?
In order to answer these questions, the first court to consider is, of
course, the Constitutional Court. In theory this Court has the task of
determining, in a final, authoritative way, the meaning of articles 80 and
87 of the Constitution and the scope of Parliament's powers under them.
But the Court has had minimal opportunities to speak to the subject, and
its contributions in this area are quite limited and hardly conclusive.
As already mentioned, Parliament, when by-passed by the govern-
ment through agreements in simplified forms in matters in which article
80 seems to require previous parliamentary authorization, could probably
commence a "conflict-of-powers" suit before the Constitutional Court to
vindicate its rights. But Parliament thus far has never decided to act,
and so the Court was not spurred, from this side, to spell out the mean-
ing of the article.
The Court can be reached, however, also from another side. Ordi-
32. On the Bozzi amendment: RELAZIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE PARLAMENTARE PER LE
RIFORME ISTITUZIONALi 36 (1984).
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nary and administrative courts could refer to it the question of constitu-
tionality of statutes ex post facto approving international agreements for
which the letter of article 80 contemplates an authorization in advance.
This has indeed happened, but up to now only once. And the Court has
sidestepped the issue, by deciding the case on another ground. 33 The
Court annulled the statute under attack because the procedure followed
to approve it had not been correct in other respects. Namely, the vote
had been cast in a committee meeting and not by the whole House. The
decision nevertheless carried some important consequences. The Court's
reasoning and some dicta seem to indirectly validate the practice of later
approvals even in areas apparently reserved to previous authorizations.
At any rate, the Court at a minimum did not disturb the practice, and
this de facto helped the cause of the government.
34
The Constitutional Court has issued other pronouncements dealing
with treaties, the importance of which cannot be doubted. But they are
not immediately relevant to the problem of the participation of Parlia-
ment in the formation of treaties. The decisions that come closer to being
relevant here are the ones by which the Court, while interpreting article
75, has ruled that referenda may not be held on proposals to abrogate,
not only statutes authorizing the ratification of a treaty, but also statutes
providing rules intended to implement a treaty in force. 35 These deci-
sions indeed protect the role of Parliament in the area of treaties, not
against the Executive-the other agency operating in the treaty-making
process-but against any encroachment in the process by the institutions
of direct democracy, to the possible detriment of the prerogatives both of
Parliament and of the Executive.
Parliament cannot, by its own adopted procedures, modify the rules
of a treaty, or attach to it reservations of its own, when approving the
statute of article 80 authorizing ratification and issuing the "order of exe-
cution." Thus, ordinary and administrative courts, when called upon in
deciding cases to apply treaty rules introduced into the Italian system by
virtue of any such statute, are not facing a problem of reconciling possi-
ble parliamentary norms attached to the treaty and the rules of the
treaty. The courts' duty is to apply the treaty made "executory" by the
statute, i.e., the rules of the treaty, together, possibly, with the reserva-
33. Decision of Dec. 18, 1984, Corte costituzionale [Corte cost.], 29 Giurisprudenza Costitu-
zionale [G. cost.], No. 295, at 2186 (Italy).
34. Id.
35. I.e., Decision of Feb. 7, 1978, Corte cost., 23 G. cost., No. 16, at 79; Decision of Feb. 13,
1981, Corte cost., 26 G. cost., No. 30, at 191; Decision of Feb. 13, 1981, Corte cost., 26 G. cost., No.
31, at 198.
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tions expressed by the government at the moment of ratification. These
reservations are part of the treaty as ratified by Italy and as binding upon
it internationally; they are usually published together with the treaty, or
soon after, by the government. The interpretation of the rules of a treaty
must be made, according to Italian law, on the basis of the canons gov-
erning at international law the interpretation of treaties. And the inter-
pretation must be made by the courts, theoretically, in full independence
from any influence of the government or of Parliament. Treaty rules,
made "executory" by statute, are the equivalent of Italian statutory law
rules, the meaning of which the courts are supposed to determine autono-
mously. Only with respect to reservations is the opinion of the govern-
ment (their only originator) likely to have, by itself, a decisive weight as
to their scope.
36
Parliament may, through a subsequent statute (purporting further
implementation of, or simply dealing with the matter regulated by, a
treaty) depart from the rules, already "executory" in Italy, of the treaty
itself. In such a case, ordinary and administrative courts are obliged, by
current Italian constitutional law, to give precedence to the subsequent
statute. Nevertheless, it is well established that courts are supposed to
interpret the statute, as far as possible, so as to avoid all conflict with the
treaty.3 7 In other words, the will of Parliament can and should be disre-
garded to the advantage of the treaty, unless it is expressed in ways that
defy all possible circumvention by judicial interpretation.
An indirect but important defense of the prerogatives of Parliament
in the treaty-making process comes from ordinary and administrative
courts in the less frequent cases in which international rules must be ap-
plied that have been stipulated without prior statutory approval and have
been introduced into the Italian legal system by a simple governmental
decree. If such rules are in contrast with Italian statutory law, they can-
not prevail. According to the Italian system of law sources, rooted in the
Constitution, only a rule having the same rank and force as a statute (or
a superior rank and force) can modify, or derogate from, statutory law.
An international rule introduced by a governmental decree can prevail
over governmental regulations, but not over statutes. If it conflicts with
these, the courts must refuse to apply it. In this way, article 80's require-
ment that modifications of statutory law by treaties must be approved by
36. On the interpretation of international treaties to be applied in Italy, see QUADRI, supra note
6, at 76; GIULIANO, ET AL., supra note 10, at I, 427, 640; A. Ruini, L'interpretazione delle conven-
zioni internazionali e delle normne straniere in genere da parte del giudice interno, I FORO ITALIANO,
518 (1955).
37. GIULIANO, ET AL., supra note 10, at I, 641-42.
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Parliament through a statute is guaranteed. The letter of article 80, to be
sure, seems to require in all cases a prior approval. This cannot be guar-
anteed by the courts because the Constitutional Court has also appar-
ently countenanced the remedy of a subsequent approval. Prior or
subsequent, at any rate, a statutory approval must be there, and the
courts make certain that the principle is not flouted.
The same can be said of international agreements carrying financial
burdens. In one way or another, sooner or later, they must find a statu-
tory basis in order for the necessary funds to be spendable. An adminis-
trative court, the Court of Accounts, would stop any state expenditure
not justified by a provision in a chapter of the state budget, which Parlia-
ment must approve by statute.
38
Also, treaties providing for arbitrations or judicial settlements
should, in order to be enforceable in Italy at least towards private sub-
jects, probably be approved by statute; a governmental decree would not
suffice. Finally, as to agreements "political by nature," but not involving
any of the other aforementioned situations, ordinary and administrative
courts may refuse to enforce them, alleging article 80, if the "orders of
execution" are expressed in simple decrees and not in statutes. The event
is, however, highly unlikely. It is not known to have ever occurred.
III. THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to the Vienna treaty of 1964, article 46, a state may not
invoke the violation of its internal rules of competence to invalidate a
treaty it has concluded, unless "the violation was manifest and concerned
a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance."
One issue is whether Italy could, by invoking the letter of articles 80
and 87 of its Constitution, claim that agreements concluded by its gov-
ernment without prior statutory authorization in the matters indicated
by article 80 are invalid. The answer to the question must be a negative
one.
It would be difficult to deny that the rules of article 80, in them-
selves, are "fundamental" in Italian law. But the point is that their inter-
pretation is, to say the least, controversial. Jurists are divided as to their
scope and as to the internal legal consequences of their violation. More-
over, and more important, the Italian Parliament has never formally ob-
jected to the conclusion of treaties by the government without prior
38. Nevertheless there are cases where the state finances may be affected and Parliament might
never be called upon to give specific consent. This happens, for instance, when the Executive simply
agrees in a simplified form to the postponement of the payment of a debt by a foreign nation.
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statutory authorization in cases where the letter of article 80 would seem
to require it. It has confirmed, post factum, the action of the govern-
ment, through approval by subsequent statute. The Constitutional Court
did not disturb the practice; indeed, it seems to have validated it. All this
shows that the letter of article 80 cannot be considered controlling.
The practice indicates that the prior authorization is not essential.
Therefore, at a minimum, the alleged violation of the rules of articles 80
and 87, concerning the role of Parliament in the treaty-making process,
would not be "manifest" to the other party (or parties) to the treaty. The
other party would have concluded the agreement in good faith, believing,
on a reasonable assumption, that the Italian government was competent
and was not violating Italian constitutional law. By similar reasoning,
the hypothetical claim that agreements concluded by Italy in simplified
form are invalid because excluded by the letter of article 87 would have
to be found completely groundless.
IV. CONCLUSION
The progress of the "democratization" of the treaty-making process
has been, in Italy, slow and limited. The potential impact of the provi-
sions of article 80, which could have been substantial if the provisions
had been followed to the letter, has been contained and checked in actual
practice. The government, which in matters of internal politics has been
often compelled, at least since the 1960s, to accept compromises with the
various and divergent forces present in Parliament, has had a truly free
hand in matters of foreign policy and in particular in the process of
treaty-making.
I do not regard these developments as negative. On the contrary, I
believe that they correspond to the true interest of the nation. There was,
of course, the problem of adapting the behavior of the Italian state or-
gans to the practices of concluding treaties that became prevalent after
the Second World War, a problem that could not be solved except by
bypassing the letter of the provisions of articles 80 and 87 of the Consti-
tution. But the real problem lay deeper in the very structures of the Ital-
ian political system. After 1960, the conduct of Italian foreign policy
through treaty-making (and through other operations) would have been
severely hampered if it had been passed through a prior scrutiny and
authorization by Parliament. A Ponsonby rule applied consistently in the
context of the Italian political life could have been highly obnoxious.
Unlike the British cabinet, the Italian government is a coalition govern-
ment, weak and exposed to all possible forms of covert blackmail. Giv-
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ing Parliament the power, not capable of being bypassed, to stop the
government's actions in advance would have complicated the latter's al-
ready difficult tasks.
This is also the reason why I would not view favorably the adoption
of the constitutional amendment proposed by the Bozzi committee or
any other similar amendment. The existing, normal means of parliamen-
tary control (interrogations, motions, resolutions, etc.) are, at the mo-
ment, largely sufficient to ensure that Parliament, if it cares, can
cooperate in the shaping of foreign policy and in the making of treaties.
Of course, this judgment could radically change if structural re-
forms of the political system gave to the Italian government the steadi-
ness, the power of leadership and the efficiency that characterize the
British cabinet. But that is another question.
